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SCHOOL BOARD OF NASSAU COUNTY V. ARLINE: AN
EXTENSION WITHIN MANAGEABLE BOUNDS
PROTECTING THE HANDICAPPED
I. INTRODUCTION
[T]o protect them, not only as equals before the law, but also in
their health, their homes, their firesides, their liberties as men,
as workers, and as citizens; to overcome and conquer
prejudices and antagonism; to secure to them the right to life,
and the opportunity to maintain that life .... I
The handicapped of America have faced discrimination in a variety
of settings, such as access to public buildings and transportation, hous-
ing, and employment.. In 1973, Congress enacted legislation to assist
these individuals in overcoming the numerous obstacles that have lim-
ited their potential contribution to society. The Rehabilitation Act 2 cre-
ated a means of prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped in
federally funded activities and programs. The broad language of the Act
encompasses the wide range of disabilities and situations where discrim-
ination exists in our society.
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,3 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the questions of whether a person with contagious tuberculosis
is a "handicapped person" under the Act and, if so, whether that person
is "otherwise qualified" to teach elementary school. 4 This Comment fo-
cuses on the history and facts leading up to this decision, and examines
its effect and application to future disputes involving communicable dis-
eases. Part II discusses communicable diseases and develops the back-
ground of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, focusing on section 504 and
case law. Part III discusses School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. Part IV
analyzes specific aspects and applications of the Court's holding in Ar-
line, taking the view that the decision was proper and just, and that the
result does not make unmanageable the handling of communicable dis-
eases addressed under section 504 of the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Communicable Diseases
Case law involving the Rehabilitation Act has been extensive. Yet,
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, communicable disease as a handicap under this legislation had
1. Speech by S. Gompers (1898).
2. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1982)) [hereinafter the "Act" or "Rehabilitation Act"].
3. 408 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd, 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1123, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1913 (1987).
4. 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
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never been squarely addressed. This section of the Comment will dis-
cuss communicable diseases, more specifically tuberculosis, and the lim-
ited amount of legislation directed at the control of these communicable
diseases.
1. Overview
The term "communicable disease" is identified with a variety of af-
flictions, encompassing a myriad of symptoms and numerous means of
transmission. "Communicable," "infectious," and "contagious" have
each been used to describe a type of condition which can be transferred
from one organism to another. "Infectious" refers to the communica-
tion of a condition due to the action of a microorganism that is trans-
ferred with or without contact. "Contagious," though, describes disease
that is passed by contact and, as such, is easily transmitted. 5 Disorders
such as the common cold, chicken pox, and measles, as well as leprosy,
plague, gonorrhea and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
("AIDS"), are just a few examples of the over 200 identified infectious
diseases that are contracted by millions of people annually.
6
Some of the microorganisms that cause communicable diseases are
viruses, bacteria, and fungi. 7 Since each microorganism differs in form,
there is a variance in the mode each is transmitted. Most common is the
passing of disease directly from human to human by coughing, sneezing,
touching, biting, kissing, or sexual intercourse. The disease may also be
transferred indirectly through a contaminated source, such as utensils,
fabrics, or blood transfusions. Animal bites or insect stings are still a
third medium of transmission, involving animal to human contact. 8
The symptoms associated with each disease vary, as do the risks of
transmission. Upon identification of a communicable disease, the
knowledge of the mode of such transfer allows public health officials to
reasonably isolate the type of transmission and to take measures to con-
trol it.9 The division of these diseases by the American Public Health
5. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 315, 707 (5th laywers' ed. 1982). "Communica-
ble" or "infectious" can also refer to diseases that are capable of transfer, but may not be
so currently, though all three terms may denote a present ability to pass the disease to
others. Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 2, n.2, School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987) (citation omitted).
6. 35 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 782 (Jan. 3, 1986).
7. HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 455-56 (11 th ed. 1987).
8. CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES IN MAN 457-58 (A. Benenson 14th ed.
1985).
9. Prior to general medical acceptance of communicability of diseases, it was com-
monly held that human contact was the sole perpetrator of transmission. Control of such
disease was thought to consist of quarantine and isolation. Upon acceptance of microor-
ganisms as the cause of infection, emphasis has moved toward education of the public and
research into and treatment with vaccines and drugs. Brief of the State of California as
Amicus Curiae at 5, Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987) (citing C. WINSLOW, THE CONQUEST OF
EPIDEMIC DISEASE 181-83, 309-10, 364-76 (1943); P. WEHRLE & F. Top, COMMUNICABLE
AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 19-27, 29 (9th ed. 1981)). For a discussion on controlling com-
municable diseases through vaccination, see Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government
In Protecting Citizens From Communicable Diseases, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 537 (1978) (concerning
the swine flu virus "epidemic"). The author wishes to express his neutrality as to the
[Vol. 65:2-3
ARLINE: PROTECTING THE HANDICAPPED
Association assists the officials by establishing notice standards for each
class and subclass based on necessity of action.10
2. Legislation
Statutes relating to communicable diseases are of generally two
types-reporting and isolation. The former only requires cases of infec-
tious diseases to be reported to public health officials, but does not deny
the afflicted any rights or liberties. The latter is used to protect the pub-
lic by isolating the disease carrier, either generally during periods of
communicability, or in specific situations and activities.1  When ex-
treme measures-such as capture and detention-are used, which in-
fringe on the rights of an individual, the action must be substantiated by
a compelling governmental interest, based on case-by-case evaluations
by local health authorities.
Federal legislation generally concerns isolation,12 while the matters
of reporting, records, and quarantine are overseen by the individual
states. Federal regulations are limited in scope to prevent the introduc-
tion, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign
countries into the United States or from one state into another.' 3 The
section only allows for quarantine and inspection, based upon recom-
mendations made by the National Advisory Health Council and the Sur-
geon General, as specified by executive orders of the President. 14 A
reasonable belief that an individual is infected with a communicable dis-
ease, and will be moving from one state to another state, or will be the
source of infecting others who will be moving, is required for apprehen-
sion and examination. 15 The Secretary of Health is authorized to de-
velop, organize and plan the means for prevention of communicable
diseases, and to oversee the coordination of federal-state and interstate
interests relating to the diseases.
16
actions taken to suppress the spread of communicable diseases in the manners previously
stated in this footnote. It is intended only to represent a guide to research in one philoso-
phy of such treatments.
10. Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 3, Arline, 107 S. Ct.
1123 (1987). Diseases are divided into five classes, each with many subclasses, and are
based on need for investigation and control. For example, tuberculosis is a Class 2B dis-
ease, and cases of such must be reported to local health authorities, to be weekly for-
warded by mail to higher health authorities. Id. at 4. Generally, these reporting practices,
and not the relative contagiousness of the diseases, are the traditional bases for the
classifications.
11. Joint Appendix at 59, Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1982). The regulation generally allows for apprehension,
detention, examination, and conditional release of those qualifying under section 264(d).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 243 (1982) (federal-state cooperation in control of communicable
disease).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 264(b). An Executive Order by President Reagan specified the com-
municable diseases included under section 264(b) as "Cholera or suspected Cholera,
Diphtheria, infectious Tuberculosis, Plague, suspected Smallpox, Yellow Fever, and sus-
pected Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Congo-Crimean, and others not
yet isolated or named)." Exec. Order No. 12,452, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,927 (1983).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d).
16. Some federal legislation has been aimed specifically towards cooperation between
1988]
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Certain state legislation, in addition to laws on reporting their con-
dition, relates to the exclusion or isolation of infectious individuals. The
laws of Florida present a general overview of the state statutes gov-
erning communicable disease. Most states have legislation which con-
fers general duties and powers to the state or local department of health.
Under Florida's general statutory provisions outlining these duties and
powers, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of Florida
(the "Department of Health") is given the duty of supervision and en-
forcement of the laws, rules, and regulations relating to communicable
disease, and is required to cooperate with the appropriate federal offi-
cials, and municipal and county officials and employees, in the enforce-
ment, prevention, and suppression of these diseases. 17 In addition to
these duties, the Department of Health provides thorough investiga-
tions, studies, and dissemination of information to the public on the oc-
currence, cause, an4 mode of transmission, as well as the means of
prevention and control of communicable disease.18 It also assumes con-
trol and management upon determination that the disease is "conta-
gious or infectious and a menace to public health."' 19
Florida state laws for tuberculosis are quite similar to those laws
that generally cover communicable diseases. Such laws require that the
infected person have "active tuberculosis and [be] dangerous to the
public health,"'20 and upon investigation and determination of such, that
the Department of Health assume charge and management of the case,
incurring all necessary and legitimate expenses. 2 1 Additionally, besides
those laws found in Florida, many states have statutes which authorize
the exclusion of students 22 or teachers 2 3 from the classroom based on
federal, state, and local authorities to assist in the enforcement of quarantine regulations,
and the corresponding planning and training involved with it. See 42 U.S.C. § 243 (1982).
17. See FLA. STAT. § 381.031(l)(a)-(d) (1986); FLA. STAT. § 381061(2) (1986).
18. FLA. STAT. § 381.031(l)(e) & (f) (1986).
19. FLA. STAT. § 381.351 (1986). The control of communicable disease is also cov-
ered under FLA. STAT. § 384, which refers to venereal diseases. The Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services is again the agent in charge of reporting, investigation, and
treatment. Section 384.24 makes it unlawful for any person infected with a venereal dis-
ease, with knowledge of such, to communicate the disease to any other person through
sexual intercourse unless such other person has been informed of the presence of the
disease.
Under the list of included diseases is human T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III)
infection, the virus associated with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and
AIDS-Related Complex (ARC). The reporting of cases of HTLV-III infection are limited
to physician diagnosed cases of AIDS and ARC, based upon diagnostic criteria from the
Centers for Disease Control of the United States Public Health Service. FLA. STAT.
§ 384.25(2) (1986). See infra note 247 for a discussion of AIDS and ARC.
20. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.25 & 392.26 (West 1986). The Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services investigates any "suspicious" cases of disease and determines if the
condition is contagious or infectious. FLA. STAT. § 381.351 (1986).
21. FLA. STAT. § 381.351 (1986).
22. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.045(41) (1987) (general welfare); WIsc. STAT. ANN.
§§ 143.12 & 143.06 (West 1974) (communicable disease and tuberculosis, respectively).
23. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-505(b) (1984) ("continuing" teachers suffering
from pulmonary tuberculosis requesting a leave of absence shall be granted such); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 122 §§ 24-25 (1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 55B (Law. Co-op. 1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 125.17 subd. 4(4) (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:40-10 (West
1968); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 913 (McKinney 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-300 (1985).
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general or specific conditions.
B. Legislative History of the Rehabilitation Act and Title V
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Act") was enacted "to develop
and implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee
of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vo-
cational rehabilitation and independent living" for the nation's handi-
capped.2 4  It provides the basis for the Rehabilitation Services
Administration to authorize federal programs 25 for assisting this class in
overcoming discrimination in a variety of settings, while promoting their
standing as self-supporting members of the community. Congress in-
tended for the Rehabilitation Act "to the maximum extent possible...
fully integrat[e]" the handicapped "into the mainstream of life." '26 Ad-
ditionally, Senator Taft, in reference to section 504 of the Act, ex-
pressed some of the motivations for this anti-discrimination legislation:
Too many handicapped Americans are not served at all,
too many lack jobs, and too many are underemployed-utilized
in capacities well below the levels of their training, education,
and ability .... [I]f we are to assure that all handicapped per-
sons may participate fully in the rewards made possible by the
vocational rehabilitation program, we must devote more of our
energy toward elimination of the most disgraceful barrier of
all-discrimination.
27
When the Act was passed, Congress estimated that seven million
Americans would benefit from this legislation 28 which would effect
roughly one-half of all businesses. 29 These numbers alone demonstrate
that the assistance afforded to handicapped individuals has as much an
effect on America in general as it does on the handicapped.
The Act bars the federal government,3 0 federal contractors," l and
24. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
25. Id. § 702.
26. S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978).
27. Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 171, 172 n.6 (1980) (citing 119 CONG. REC. 24,587 (1973)) [hereinafter
Rehabititating Section 504].
28. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., ist Sess. 2, repnnted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2091.
29. Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on
the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2043 (noted in Wolff, Protecting the
Disabled Minority: Rights and Remedies Under Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 25, 26 & n.9 (1978)).
30. Rehabilitation Act § 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982).
31. Rehabilitation Act § 503 reads in part:
(a) [A]ny contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal depart-
ment or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal serv-
ices (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision
requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party con-
tracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance
in employment qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(7) of
this title. ...
29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982). The section also applies to any subcontracts in excess of
$2,500 under the same terms as above, id., and provides the applicable filing and investiga-
1988]
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employers who receive federal funds3 2 from discriminating against a
handicapped individual solely on the basis of that handicap.3 3 Section
504 of the Act prohibits such discrimination in any federally funded ac-
tivity or program.3 4 This prohibition is consequently broad, since the
Act does not direct its coverage at discrimination in any specific area;
yet, its legislative history points to such a conclusion.
3 5
The Act was first introduced3 6 as an amendment to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 37 In fact, section 504 is based on the anti-discrimination
language of section 60138 of the Civil Rights Act.3 9 Since legislation
tion information for complaints relative to failure to comply with the affirmative action
provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b). See infra note 43 for section 706(7).
32. Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See infra notes 63-73 and ac-
companying text (judicial interpretation of what federal financial assistance is required for
a cause of action under the Act).
33. See infra notes 93-151 and accompanying text.
34. Rehabilitation Act 4 504 provides:
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance ... "
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act added:
or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service. The head of each agency shall promulgate such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Reha-
bilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978....
Id. (emphasis added).
35. Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767, 773 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting
that Senator Cranston, who chaired the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, SenatorJavits and Senator Taft, both co-sponsors of
the Act, all made comments pointing in the direction of employment discrimination). See
also supra note 27 and accompanying text (comments by Senator Taft).
36. See H.R. 12, 154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 45, 945, 974-75 (1971) (by
Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio); S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 118 CONG. REc. 525-
26 (1972) (by Senators Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Charles Percy of Illinois). For
additional legislative history on the Rehabilitation Act besides that mentioned in other
notes' see, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971); 119 CONG. REC. 24550, 29698, 30148
(1973); 120 CONG. REC. 30531 (1974); 124 CONG. REC. 13885, 30292, 30322-25, 30559,
31590 (1978); H.R. REP. Nos. 928, 1581, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. REP. Nos. 42,
244, 500, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S.
REP. No. 1135, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. REP. Nos. 48, 391, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
37. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to
2000d-6 (1982)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; section 504 is also similar to Section 901 of the Education
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (1982)).
39. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6390. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act states: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-6
(1982). For additional legislative history of Section 504 and the Rehabilitation Act, see
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-98 (1985); Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
687 F.2d 767, 772-76 (3d Cir. 1982); Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
681 F.2d 1376, 1378-82 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d
292, 301-04 (5th Cir. 1981) (applicability of the Act to Federal government hiring); Lloyd
v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977); Cook and Butler, Coverage
of Employment Discrimination Pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 19 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 581, 590-99 (1983) [hereinafter Employment Discrimination] (includes discus-
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addressing both public and private sector discrimination on race, sex,
national origin, religion, or age had been in effect for a number of years,
the movement to expand protection to include handicapped individuals
under section 504 was a logical progression of the law. 40 Further ex-
pansion of the Act was needed to limit the application of the legislation
within Congress' intended purposes. This was accomplished with
amendments in 1974 and 1978, and regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW").
After passage in 1973, the Act was first amended in 197441 to clarify
and broaden the coverage of discrimination against the handicapped.
Congress intended that section 504 "have as broad a sweep as its lan-
guage suggests,"' 4 2 and the 1974 Amendments furthered this intent by
expanding the term "handicapped individual."143 Originally interpreted
under the 1973 language only in terms of employability, partially due to
its relation to vocational rehabilitation services, 4 4 the expansion in 1974
allowed the definition to be more broadly construed. 4 5 As seen by the
sion of post-enactment history); Rehabilitating Section 504, supra note 27, at 172-79; Note,
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, Section 504, and Handicapped Rights, 16 CAL. W.L. REV.
523, 525-30 (1980).
40. Comment, Employment Discrimination-Analyzing Handicap Discrimination Claims: The
Right Tools for the Job, 62 N.C.L. REV. 535, 535 n.2 [hereinafter Analyzing Handicap Claims].
This expansion was logical because the handicapped's protection from discrimination
prior to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was limited to claims of denial of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment or violation of state anti-discrimination laws amended to
include the handicapped. Legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d to 2000d-6, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634, had been in effect for nine and six years, respectively, giving these classes
additional protection under federal law. See id. This Comment also refers to Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), as the
case which " 'placed in the public eye, for the first time, the notion that the courts could be
used to secure constitutional and statutory rights for handicapped persons.' " Analyzing
Handicap Claims, 62 N.C.L. REV. 535, 535 n.2 (quoting THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED
PERSONS 52 (R. Burgdorf, Jr. ed. 1980)).
41. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1619.
Additional amendments included the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Devel-
opment Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2982, and two
minor amendments-the Rehabilitation Act Extension of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-230, 70
Stat. 211, and the Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-221, 98 Stat. 17.
See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (discussion of the amendments of 1978).
42. Employment Discrimination, supra note 39, at 595.
43. Section 706 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 originally defined a "handicapped
individual" as: "[Any individual who (i) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to subchapters I
and III of this chapter." In 1974, this definition was expanded to read:
Subject to the second sentence of this subparagraph, the term "handicapped indi-
vidual" means, for purposes of subchapters IV and V of this chapter, any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment ....
29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982) (emphasis added).
44. Employment Discrimination, supra note 39, at 594 (citing S. REP. No. 1297, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6373, 6388 (Senate
Committee report discussion on need for change in "handicapped individual" definition)).
See supra note 43 at (ii) & (iii) (amended portion of "handicapped individual" to deal with
this problem).
45. Employment Discrimination, supra note 39, at 594 (going beyond the limited employ-
ment discrimination interpretation that it had been given).
1988]
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courts, the 1974 Amendments added clarity to the 1973 Act and direc-
tion for interpretation of congressional intent.4 6 Yet, the Act, as of
these first amendments, had no corresponding procedures or rules for
implementation to assist in its interpretation.
Section 504 of the Act contains only references to the definitions
found in other parts of the Act and areas where discrimination is prohib-
ited.4 7 It designates no guidelines for formulation of rules or regula-
tions to provide federally funded programs with direction under the Act.
Since prompt implementation of section 504 was understood as in-
tended by Congress, 4 8 the President of the United States issued an Ex-
ecutive Order49 assigning the Secretary of HEW the responsibility to
coordinate the rules and regulation procedures to be followed by those
federal departments and agencies authorized to extend federal financial
assistance.50 The Secretary was also authorized to establish standards
for determining who is a handicapped individual and to formulate
guidelines for determining what discriminatory practices are within sec-
tion 504.51
The HEW regulations and rules represented a guide, beyond the
language found in the Act itself, for the interpretation and successful
implementation of a broad-based employment discrimination pro-
gram.5 2 The authority of the Secretary of the HEW to promulgate these
regulations specifically enforcing prohibition against employment dis-
crimination has been affirmed by the courts, though at least one decision
has given them "diminished deference."
5 3
The HEW regulations that were promulgated conformed to the
procedures, remedies, and rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act,54 and Congress codified these regulations 5 5 through additional
amendments to assure administrative due process and consistency
within the federal government that the Act had lacked. 56 The Rehabili-
46. Id. at 595 (citing NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1258 n.48 (3d
Cir. 1979).
47. See supra note 34.
48. Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing S. REP. No. 1139,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1457, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1974)
(Conference report); S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1974)).
49. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)
(followed by implementation of regulations by Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare- now divided into the Department of Education and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services-45 C.F.R. § 84 (1986), which included the com-
plaint and enforcement procedures from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Exec.
Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981) gave the Department ofJustice responsibility for
coordinating federal agency implementation of section 504.
50. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1986).
51. Id. § 84.4; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702 (1986) (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission definitions relative to section 504).
52. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (for prohibition of discrimination in employment).
53. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 n.l I (1979).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. See also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 P.2d 292,
302-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (specific discussion of Section 505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. § 7 94(a), and Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16).
55. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1986).
56. Le Strange, 687 F.2d 767, 774 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing SEN. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong.,
[Vol. 65:2-3
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tation, Comprehensive Services, and Development Disabilities Amend-
ments of 197857 also extended the prohibition of discrimination against
any "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual under section 504 to
all programs and activities conducted by any executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service. 58 These Amendments included the addi-
tion of section 50559 to the Act "to specify the means of enforcing its
ban on discrimination." '60 Section 505 (a)(2) 6 1 specifically applied those
enforcements "set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" to
those qualifying under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
62
The amendments and promulgated regulations that were added to
the Rehabilitation Act since its enactment in 1973 have made the terms
and prohibitions of the legislation more concise, and have expanded the
opportunities of the handicapped in employment and other fields. For
the Act to achieve results in accordance with its aims, broad interpreta-
tion by the courts has been necessary. The following section, dealing
with the case history of section 504 of the Act, covers the key cases
which have dealt with the application of this section, and the Act as a
whole, to a variety of situations.
C. Case History of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Judicial interpretation of section 504 has involved many aspects of
the title, ranging from the question of a private right of action for ag-
grieved individuals, to rulings on matters of federal financial assistance
and procedural requirements, as well as determinations of whether the
plaintiff is "handicapped" and "otherwise qualified." The courts, in
dealing with this myriad of issues, has maintained the broad scope of the
section's language. This section of the Comment will begin with a brief
discussion of a handicapped individual's right to bring a private action
under section 504 and the questions involved with the regulations and
remedies promulgated by the HEW. It will then focus on the federal
2d Sess. 19 (1978)). The Committee of Conference, which was assigned to reconcile dif-
ferences between the Senate and House versions of the 1978 amendments, stated: "It is
the committee's understanding that the regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare with respect to procedures, remedies, and rights under
section 504 conform with those promulgated under title VI. Thus, this amendment codifies
existing practice as a specific statutory requirement." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1978)).
57. Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978).
58. See supra note 34.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
60. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 626 (1983).
61. Section 505(a)(2) states: "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or
failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance
under section 794 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982). See Prewitt v. United States
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 301-04 (5th Cir. 1981) (for discussion of the Rehabilitation
Act's effects on federal government hiring).
62. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 626 n. 1. Note 1 in Darrone also mentions that Section
505(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 
7 94a(a)(l), indicates that remedies under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act are available to those qualifying under a violation of section 501 (relating to the
federal government's employment of the handicapped).
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courts' treatment of the terms "handicapped individual" and "otherwise
qualified"-the decisive elements for coverage under the Rehabilitation
Act.
In the majority of cases, federal courts have allowed handicapped
individuals who have been discriminated against to maintain suits under
section 504. Some employment cases brought under this section fo-
cused on whether federal financial assistance given to the employer had
the "primary objective" of providing employment. 63 If the primary ob-
jective of federal funding was to compensate the aggrieved employee, a
cause of action for discrimination existed. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation
Center, Inc. 64 was the first case in which this interpretation denied a right
of action. A registered nurse brought an action seeking reinstatement
after being dismissed from employment by a nursing home because of
her deteriorating eyesight. 6 5 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that no private right of action existed under section 504 be-
cause of the limiting language of section 505(a)(2). The language refers
to the rights, remedies, and procedures found in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits a private right of action unless the federal
funding given to a program was used primarily for employment. 6 6 This
ruling was "blithely followed" 67 by three other appellate courts, two of
which included strong disagreement with the majority ruling.68
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Jones v. Metropoli-
tan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,
69 criticized the decision in Trageser
70
and allowed a similar action for violation of section 504 of the Act. In
Jones, the court held that a former bus driver could bring an action for a
section 504 violation, caused by the metropolitan transit authority dis-
missal of the driver because of a hearing impairment. 7 1 The Eleventh
Circuit, in refusing to follow the Trageser "primary objective" standard,
based its holding on the section's legislative history and the fact that
Congress only intended to include the rights, remedies, and proce-
dures-not the restrictions found in Title VI. 72 The court determined
63. These cases held that section 505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a)(1) (1982), created by the Act's 1978 amendments, included the restrictions of
Section 604 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See infra note 66 (for specific language of
section 604 relating to "primary objective").
64. 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 89. Section 604 of the Civil Rights Act reads: "Nothing contained in this
subchapter shall be construed to authorize action . . . by any department or agency with
respect to any employment practice of any employer... except where a primary objective
of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982)
(from Le Strange, 687 F.2d 767, 778 (1982)).
67. Employment Discrimination, supra note 39, at 583.
68. See generally Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir.
1982) (Ferguson, J., dissenting); United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908
(2d Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 676 (8th Cir.
1980) (McMillan., J., concurring).
69. 681 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 1382 n.14 (unanimous).
71. Id. at 1376.
72. Id. at 1378-80 ("legislative history is devoid of language demonstrating that Con-
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that standing for a section 504 action required the plaintiff to show that
the employer received federal funds and that the plaintiff was the in-
tended beneficiary of such funds.
73
The federal courts have often used a four part test, developed by
the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 74 to determine if a private right of
action exists in the violation of a statute which contains no explicit au-
thorization for such a suit. The four factors considered are:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted' 7 5 -that is, does the statute cre-
ate a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to cre-
ate such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law?
7 6
With the initial issue of a private right of action having been re-
solved, the federal courts turned their attention to when a suit involving
the Act's coverage was ripe for judicial determination. The decision in
Cherry v. Mathews 77 addressed the specific issue concerning the HEW's
procrastination in implementing regulations and administrative reme-
dies. 78 In Cherry, the District Court for the District of Columbia com-
pelled the Secretary of HEW to "swiftly" promulgate the
implementation regulations for the Rehabilitation Act. 79 This decision,
forcing the HEW to issue the long awaited regulations, led to the re-
quirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted before seek-
gress intended Section 604 of Title VI to apply to suits under the Rehabilitation Act
.... .).
73. Id. at 1382.
74. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Ash involved a private and derivative suit brought by a stock-
holder in Bethlehem Steel Corp. for damages and injunctive relief against the corporate
directors' authorization of general corporate fund expenditures for advertisements relat-
ing to the 1972 presidential elections. The District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania denied Ash's petition for injunctive relief and granted, without opinion,
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 350 F. Supp. 227 (1972). The court held that
the applicable criminal statute prohibiting such contributions was limited to penal sanc-
tions, and implied no private cause of action. 350 F. Supp. at 231.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a private cause of action
was proper to remedy a violation of the statute and to secure relief. 496 F.2d 416, 424 (3d
Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the provision
of a criminal penalty in a statute does not necessarily preclude an implied private cause of
action for damages, 422 U.S. at 79 (citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 191, 201-02 (1967)), but in the case at hand, no statutory basis existed whatsoever.
422 U.S. at 80.
75. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citing Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39
(1916)).
76. Id. at 78.
77. 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976).
78. See generally 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). See also supra note 49-51 and accom-
panying text (for discussion of the HEW procedures).
79. Cherty, 419 F. Supp. at 924.
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ing judicial relief under section 504.80 Such an obligation was
important because prior to the effective date of the HEW regulations,
8 '
the exhaustion of remedies had not been essential or practical due to the
lack of procedures for relief available to officials outside of the judiciary.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Lloyd v. Regional
Transportation Authority,8 2 held that administrative remedies were not re-
quired since no enforcement regulations providing adequate relief yet
existed.8 3 The court felt that the plaintiffs were the people in the best
position to seek enforcement of section 504 since that legislation was
enacted for their protection. 84 Only if a suit was brought under a sec-
tion 504 violation, prior to implementation of the regulations, and an
alternative request for relief was filed under another administrative stat-
ute,8 5 did the courts generally require that all administrative remedies
must first be exhausted.
86
To establish a prima facie case for a section 504 employment dis-
crimination violation, a plaintiff does not have to prove that the em-
ployer intentionally discriminated. 87 The only proof required is that
"the challenged standard disparately disadvantages the protected group
of which he is a member, and that he is qualified for the position under
all but the challenged criteria." s8 8 These elements were established in
Prewitt v. United Postal Service,89 where a handicapped individual with lim-
ited mobility in one arm and shoulder applied for the position of mail
clerk with the United States Postal Service, but was refused employment.
On appeal in an action for violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision rendering
summary judgment for the Postal Service, and remanded the case to de-
80. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1986) (for regulations).
81. June 3, 1977 (nearly four years after the passage of the Rehabilitation Act).
82. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (action brought by mobility-disabled persons seek-
ing injunctive relief against public transportation authority; the court vacated an order
dismissing the action and remanded the case).
83. Id. at 1286.
84. Id. at 1285-87.
85. For example, if a plaintiff, in addition to a request for relief under section 504,
included a request under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793, or section
601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (both of
which provide for administrative enforcement), the remedies therein must be exhausted
prior to the availability ofjudicial relief. Annotation, Construction and Effect of Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Prohibiting Discrimination Against Otherwise Qualified Handicapped
Individuals in Specified Programs or Activities, 44 A.L.R. FED. 148, 169 (1979) [hereinafter Effect
of Section 504].
86. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919, 924-25 (D.D.C.
1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 816-18 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
87. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971) ("The Act proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."). The Court held that an employer could not use written tests and a high
school degree requirement if those criteria were not shown to be related to job perform-
ance. This case is the leading decision on "disparate impact" discrimination (see infra note
139 and accompanying text for definition).
88. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir. 1981). The bur-
den then shifts to the employer who must prove that the challenged criteria are "job re-
lated." Id.
89. 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
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termine if the standards relied upon by the Service were unfair. The
court of appeals held that the appellant had made a prima facie case of
discrimination based on a factual showing that he was handicapped and
"otherwise qualified" for the position. 90 This was established by the
fact that Prewitt had previously performed similar postal duties in a sat-
isfactory manner, despite his handicap, and by an affidavit verifying that
his condition had not changed since such performance.9 ' These undis-
puted facts were sufficient, in view of the lack of contrary evidence, to
raise the issue of whether the Postal Service's standards and actions in
this case were justifiable.
9 2
The early case law involving the Rehabilitation Act generally in-
cluded procedural questions. However, such questions have not been
major issues in subsequent litigation. The disputes presented before
the courts since these early decisions, as well as those presently being
litigated, focus on the interpretation of two key terms which determine
whether an individual is protected by the Act-"handicapped individ-
ual" and "otherwise qualified." The following two sections of this Com-
ment will review many of the cases which defined conditions amounting
to a handicap under the Act and those cases which helped to guide
courts in determining requirements for being otherwise qualified.
1. Handicapped Individual
The term "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 is defined in terms of a history of "physical or mental impairment"
which limits the aggrieved's activities.9 3 The interpretation of a "handi-
capped individual" has been a paramount consideration in the federal
courts' grants of relief in cases involving different conditions covered by
section 504.
In Drennon v. Philadelphia General Hospital,94 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed such an issue involving an
90. Id. at 309.
91. Id.
92. Id. The standards for postal carriers involved "the ability to see, hear, lift heavy
weights, carry moderate weights, reach above shoulder, and use fingers and both hands."
Id. at 298. The postal authorities, upon advice of a postal medical officer who determined
Prewitt "medically unsuitable for postal employment," informed the claimant of his rejec-
tion without stating any reasons for the findings. A similar result was arrived at on appeal
to a regional medical officer. Both doctors based their conclusions on an eight year-old
Veteran's Administration ("VA") medical record, since Prewitt refused to take a voluntary
physical. Id. at 298-99. The district court based its summary judgment on this refusal,
stating that Prewitt could not use the VA report as foundation for his action when it "dis-
close[s] substantial disability [30% disability causing limited arm and shoulder use]." Id.
at 300.
93. See supra note 43. "Physical or mental impairment" is defined as:
(1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomi-
cal loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: Neurological; mus-
culoskeletal; special sense organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-
urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (2) any mental or psycho-
logical disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b) (1986).
94. 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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individual who was denied employment at a hospital because she had
experienced an epileptic seizure within two years of her application for
the position. The court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint, and
stated that it was too "self evident" that persons with epilepsy are handi-
capped and that such a determination "could not better foster the goals
of the legislation in question." 9 5 Similarly, in Duran v. City of Tampa,9 6 a
motion to dismiss the discrimination action was denied by the District
Court for the Middle District of Florida. The plaintiff had been refused
consideration for the position of policeman because of a history of epi-
lepsy. This history was limited to his childhood since he had not exper-
ienced any symptoms in sixteen years and had not taken any medicine
for the disease for nine years. 9 7 Even though he was no-longer consid-
ered an epileptic, the court determined that his claim was still actionable
under the "perceived handicap" language of the Act, reasoning that his
history with the handicap and the treatment relating to that handicap
justified such an action.9 8
In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,9 9 retarded residents
of a state-operated school were considered "handicapped individuals"
under section 504. The suit was brought by one of the retarded resi-
dents of Pennhurst as a class action, alleging that "unsanitary, inhu-
mane, and dangerous" conditions existed at the school, and that
conditions denied the class members their rights under the Rehabilita-
tion Act.10 0 The court, in recognizing the substandard care given to the
residents, ordered that they be provided with nondiscriminatory habili-
tation.10 1 In Doe v. Colautti,10 2 the District Court for the Eastern District
95. Id. at 815.
96. 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla.),final order, 451 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
97. 430 F. Supp. at 76.
98. Id. at 78. The Act states that a handicapped individual is defined as "any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) (emphasis added). For the full text of
the definition of "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act, see supra note 43.
99. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979), rev'don other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
100. 446 F. Supp. at 1296. In addition to claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the class
members charged that they were denied rights under the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6001 (1982), and the Pennsylvania Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon
1969). Also, the claimants stated that conditions denied them due process and equal pro-
tection guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment, and subjected them to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The district
court found all of these rights to be violated, id. at 1308-22, and held that the retarded
residents had a right to "minimally adequate habilitation" in the "least restrictive environ-
ment." Id. at 1314-20. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed
in part, and avoided the constitutional claims of the class members by holding that their
rights were protected by the state and federal acts. 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979). The court
of appeals reversed the district court's determination that the school should be closed. It
stated that although an environment less restrictive than that offered by the school would
be best for the residents, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
did not require such action. 612 F.2d at 115.
101. 446 F. Supp. at 1326-29. The Supreme Court affirmed the determination that the
retarded residents were "handicapped" under section 504, but disagreed with the degree
of conditions the lower courts found necessary under the applicable statute. 451 U.S. I
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of Pennsylvania also held, consistent with the court in Halderman, that a
mentally impaired individual, specifically an incompetent adult inpatient
of a psychiatric hospital, was handicapped under the Act's definition.1
0 3
The court found that the patient suffered from a "physical or mental
impairment," in this case a "schizoaffective reaction."' 0 4 Additionally,
the individual was regarded as having a "mental or psychological disor-
der," as found in the regulations promulgated by HEW for defining
"handicapped."' 1 5 And, in Sites v. McKenzie, 10 6 an inmate who had
served, between the prison and mental hospital, forty five years of a life
sentence for murder, was denied access to the vocational rehabilitation
program because he was a mentally ill prisoner. 10 7 The District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, however, granted the plain-
tiff's motion for partial summary judgment observing that the prisoner
had a record of mental impairment and had been regarded as having
such an impairment.
10 8
In New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey,10 9 the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision en-
joining a board of education from excluding certain mentally retarded
children from most classrooms. The mentally retarded children were
excluded from regular school classes because they were carriers of the
hepatitis B antigen; however, no effort to identify students who did not
suffer from any mental retardation, but who still carried the antigen, was
made. The court of appeals concluded that the school board made its
decision to exclude carriers of the disease premised on a "remote possi-
bility" of infection, which did not substantiate the detrimental effects the
children suffered from being excluded from classes.' 10 Thus, the court
of appeals, based on the prima facie case of discrimination against the
handicapped students and the inability of the board of education to
"make at least a substantial showing" of its exclusion plan, held that the
board's plan violated the Rehabilitation Act. I"'
Not only have the federal courts held that an individual may be
handicapped by a disease or a mental condition, but they have also in-
cluded individuals affected by blindness and hearing impairments. For
example, a blind woman, alleging that the hiring practices of a city
school district discriminated against visuall.'y handicapped teachers, was
considered a "handicapped individual" by the District Court of the East-
(1981). The Court technically distinguished between the terms "treatment" and "habilita-
tion." The former has application to "curable mental illness," while the latter involves
"education and training for those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not ill." 451
U.S. at 7 n.2.
102. 454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
103. Id. at 626.
104. Id. at 625-26.
105. Id. at 626. See also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. W. Va. 1976).
107. Id. at 1197.
108. Id.
109. 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
110. Id. at 650-51.
111. d. at 645.
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ern District of Pennsylvania in Gurmankin v. Costanzo.1 12 The court or-
dered the school district to offer the plaintiff employment as a secondary
school teacher. Although it had found that the Act was "not dispositive
of the ... case," since the acts complained of happened prior to the
effective date of the 1973 legislation, the court noted that it was "rea-
sonably clear that a refusal to hire a blind person as a teacher is the kind
of discrimination which that section was meant to prohibit."' "1 3 Simi-
larly, in Davis v. Southeastern Community College," 1 4 a woman with a hearing
disability was denied admission by officials to an associate nursing de-
gree program because of her hearing defect. The facts stipulated that
the woman would be capable of managing the academic aspects of the
program, but her ability to communicate in surroundings where she was
unable to lip read presented difficult obstacles.' 15 The district court,
although agreeing with the plaintiff's argument that the affliction was
one provided for under the definition of "handicapped individual,"
found that she was not "otherwise qualified" under section 504 because
she could not "function sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the
handicap, [even] if proper training and facilities are suitable and
available." 16
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act has also been found to include
drug addicts or persons with a history of drug use within its protection.
In Davis v. Bucher, 1 7 the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment where a municipality refused to employ individuals
with a history of drug use. One of the individuals, Davis, had used am-
phetamines by injection in the past and, upon the discovery of his nee-
dle scars during a medical examination, was denied admittance to the
next class of firemen. 1 8 The court noted that the Act excluded only
those who are alcoholic or drug abusers and whose current use of alcohol
or drugs prevents them from performing the duties of the job, or whose
employment because of alcohol or drug abuse would pose a direct threat
to property or the safety of others."19 It did not exclude those with a
prior history of drug addiction, and thus, the city's per se exclusion of indi-
viduals with this history denied the benefits of a federally funded pro-
gram to those who had overcome their addiction or were attempting to
112. 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
113. Id. at 989.
114. 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. N.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
115. 424 F. Supp. at 1343. The court stated that "in many situations such as an opera-
tion room, intensive care unit, or post-natal care unit, all doctors and nurses wear surgical
masks which would make lip reading impossible." An audiologist that examined Davis
found that her understanding of speech, though aided by the use of a hearing aid, would
require lip reading. Id.
116. Id. at 1345-46. The court noted that Davis' "handicap actually prevents her from
safely performing in both her training program and her proposed profession" because of
"numerous situations where [her] particular disability would render her unable to function
properly." Id. at 1345.
117. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
118. Id. at 794.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (7)(B) (1982).
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do So. 120
2. Otherwise Qualified
The federal courts have also held that, in addition to being a "hand-
icapped individual," one must also be "otherwise qualified" to be
granted relief under section 504.121 In Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 12 2 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court order
denying a preliminary injunction against school officials who refused to
allow two junior high school students to participate in contact sports.
One of the students was nearly blind in one eye, and the other suffered
from a congenital cataract.' 23 The officials would not allow the two to
participate in contact interscholastic sports even though they had done
so in the past. The court based its denial of the injunction on the lack of
evidence by the plaintiffs to establish that they were "otherwise quali-
fied" to play in contact sports, and the defense's reliance on a medical
opinion that children with sight in one eye were not "qualified" to par-
ticipate in the sports because of a high risk of serious eye injury.
1 24
In another decision denying an injunction against school officials,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Doe v. New York Univer-
sity, 12 5 reversed a district court's grant of relief for the plaintiff. In the
action for mandatory preliminary injunction for readmission into medi-
cal school, a former medical student, who was suffering from mental ill-
ness, failed to prove that she was "otherwise qualified" as required by
section 504. The court of appeals determined that there was significant
risk of recurrence of her mental disturbances, and therefore, in view of
the seriousness of harm inflicted in prior episodes, the school was not
required to give preference to her over other qualified applicants who
did not pose any such risk. 126 The opinion noted that:
The institution need not dispense with reasonable precautions
or requirements which it would normally impose for safe par-
ticipation by students, doctors and patients in its activities.
Section 504 simply insures the institution's even-handed treat-
ment of a handicapped applicant who meets reasonable stan-
dards so that he or she will not be discriminated against solely
because of the handicap. But if the handicap could reasonably
be viewed as posing a substantial risk that the applicant would
be unable to meet its reasonable standards, the institution is
120. Id. at 796; see Effect of Section 504, supra note 85, at 178.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 84 contains regulations implementing section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including definitions of "otherwise qualified," 45
C.F.R. § 843(k); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702 (1986) (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission definitions relative to section 504).
122. 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
123. Id. at 298.
124. Id. at 299-300; see Effect of Section 504, supra note 85, at 179.
125. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
126. Id. at 776-77. Doe would also pose a significant risk to others during the violent
outbreaks caused by her illness. See id. at 775. See also Strathie v. Department of Transp.,
716 F.2d 227, 232-34 (3d Cir. 1983) (where hearing impaired bus driver might pose a risk
to passengers).
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not obligated by the Act to alter, dilute or bend them to admit
the handicapped applicant.1
2 7
The court of appeals pointed out that, even if Doe presented sufficient
evidence that risk of recurrence was minimal, the medical school would
not be prohibited from producing evidence that showed she was less
qualified than another applicant.12
8
In the first Supreme Court case to interpret section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, 129 Southeastern Community College v. Davis,'3 0 the Court
gave its approval of the district court's interpretation of "otherwise qual-
ified" when it defined the term as "one who is able to meet all of a pro-
gram's requirements in spite of his handicap."' 13 ' The district court
concluded that qualification is premised on the individual being "other-
wise able to function sufficiently in the position sought . . .if proper
training and facilities are suitable and available."' 132 The Court felt
these conclusions seem to "reinforce, rather than contradict," the regu-
lations promulgated by HEW, as compared to the interpretations given
"otherwise qualified" by the court of appeals. 133 The opinion is clear
that an individual must still be qualified despite the disabling condition,
and that the HEW regulations are important in assisting activities and
programs receiving federal funding in determining the qualifications re-
quired under the Act.
13 4
Simon v. St. Louis County ' 5 followed Davis and involved a suit
brought by a former police officer who alleged that the subsequent fail-
ure by the police department to rehire him after his discharge violated
the Rehabilitation Act.' 3 6 The plaintiff had suffered a gunshot wound
that left him a paraplegic and was dismissed because he was unable to
meet some of the job requirements the department felt "necessary and
127. Doe, 666 F.2d at 775 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 n.12 (1979)).
128. Id. at 780. According to information available at the time of the Doe decision, New
York University Medical School received roughly 5,000 applications per year, of which
about 170 were accepted. Id. at 765. This represents a rate of acceptance of about 3.4
percent of all those applying to the school. There is no doubt that those who enter the
school have impressive qualifications, as do many who are unsuccessful in their attempts.
129. Davis, being the first Supreme Court case concerning this area, "may be suscepti-
ble to broader interpretation than intended by the Supreme Court." Note, Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, Section 504, and Handicapped Rights, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 523, 542
(1980). This theory refers to the desire of institutions receiving federal funds to avoid
modifications to accommodate the handicapped. The institutions, such as colleges and
universities, might regard the holding in Davis as requiring no modifications in the physi-
cal requirements of a clinical training program. The holding actually distinguishes be-
tween the essential and nonessential requirements of a program, the latter being the area
where reasonable accommodation must be provided. Id.
130. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
131. Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
132. 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D. N.C. 1976).
133. Id. The applicable regulation for a "qualified handicapped person" relative to
post-secondary and vocational education services is "a handicapped person who meets the
academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the [school's]
education program or activity .... 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k)(3) (1982)).
134. See id. See also Rehabilitating Section 504, supra note 27 (additional discussion of ef-
fects of Davis on the Rehabilitation Act).
135. 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981).
136. Id. at 316.
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legitimate."' 3 7 This case, as in Davis, revolved around whether the
handicap suffered created a situation in which the aggrieved could not
meet the requirements of being "otherwise qualified." In Davis, the re-
quirements were found to be necessary to safely fulfill the obligations of
the job. Conversely, in Simon there was substantial evidence indicating
that the physical requirements were not necessary or not required by all
officers,13 8 and therefore, the case was remanded to decide this issue. 
13 9
In Gurmankin v. Costanzo,140 the District Court of the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania held that blindness does not automatically prevent a
teacher from being "otherwise qualified." Noting the special problems
that face blind teachers, 14 1 the court required that a nondiscriminatory
evaluation must be made to determine her competency. 14 2 Similarly,
the court in Duran v. Tampa 43 denied a motion to dismiss the action
because it recognized that the plaintiff appeared to be "otherwise quali-
fied." 144 In reaching this decision, the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida took notice of the Gurmankin court's evaluation
requirement14 5 and heard expert testimony from two physicians who
specialize in neurological disorders. After examining the plaintiff, the
court separately concluded that Duran was perfectly able to physically
perform as a policeman, and that his likelihood of having a seizure was
137. Id. at 320.
138. Id. at 320-21.
139. This case, along with Davis, discussed the modification of existing requirements to
accommodate the "otherwise qualified" handicapped employee; see Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-
413. In Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981), the court noted
four distinct types of discriminatory barriers that handicapped persons must confront
when seeking employment: (1) intentional discrimination for reasons of social bias, i. e.,
racial, sexual, handicapped, etc.; (2) neutral standards with disparate impact; (3) sur-
mountable impairment barriers; (4) insurmountable impairment barriers. Id. at 293-94
(citing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Sections 501, 503-05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-94(a)).
If the essential duties of the position in question can be performed by the handicapped
individual without any accommodation, the individual is a victim of "disparate impact"
discrimination; if reasonable accommodation is afforded and the job can then be done, the
individual is a victim of "surmountable barrier" discrimination. Id. at 305.
140. 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
141. Id. at 987-88.
142. Id. at 992.
143. 430 F. Supp 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
144. Id. at 78.
145. Id. In Gurmankin, the school district's refusal to hire blind teachers amounted to
an irrebuttable presumption, involving no competency evaluations. 411 F. Supp. at 990.
This is akin to the situation in Duran, except there, performance evaluations were made by
the city, but ignored upon discovery of the plaintiff's history of epilepsy, based again on an
irrebuttable presumption of incompetency. 430 F. Supp at 78.
Gurmankin was ultimately decided on constitutional grounds (fourteenth amendment),
unlike Duran, which was resolved under the Rehabilitation Act. Both courts, though, re-
lied upon the irrebuttable presumption analysis of the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of
Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In La Fleur, a pregnant teacher was forced to
take a mandatory maternity leave without pay five months prior to the expected delivery
date of her child. In holding that this policy of the Cleveland, Ohio school district created
an irrebuttable presumption of incompetency, the Court found that due process consider-
ations of the fourteenth amendment had been violated because no rational relationship
existed between the policy and the state's interest in continuing education. 414 U.S. at
644-46. But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (limiting the use of irrebuttable
presumption in cases challenging classifications).
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equal to that of anyone in the general populace.
14 6
In vacating and remanding the case to the district court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Strathie v. Department of
Transportation,1 4 7 held that reasons advanced by the state for auditory
hearing requirements must advance the essential purpose of the pro-
gram. The court produced a standard to determine "otherwise quali-
fied" in terms of accommodation:
A handicapped individual who cannot meet all of a program's
requirements is not otherwise qualified if there is a factual basis
in the record reasonably demonstrating that accommodating
that individual would require either a modification of the essen-
tial nature of the program, or impose an undue burden on the
recipient of federal funds.1
4 8
The court in Strathie looked to the decision in Davis, in which the
Supreme Court articulated the two factors required by the standard. 14
9
The Davis opinion, though, lacked comment on the scope of judicial re-
view concerning the reasonableness of a refusal to accommodate a
handicapped individual.' 50 Thus, the standard is an attempt at recon-
ciling the concerns of administrators, who demand some deference by
the courts due to their experience and knowledge in specific programs,
and the problems associated with broad judicial deference.15'
III. SCHOOL BOARD OF NASSAU COUNTY V. ARLINE
A. Facts
Gene Arline was a third grade teacher for the School Board of Nas-
sau County in Florida. She had served three years in the district on an
146. Id. at 76 (plaintiff's propensity for seizures is not increased by his prior history of
epilepsy).
147. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983). Strathie, who wore a hearing aid, was hired and
trained as a bus driver by a private bus company. After initial training, he passed Penn-
sylvania's school bus driving test as required by the state's department of transportation.
On his first day of work, Strathie's license was suspended, based on his violation of a state
statute which required that the licensee have hearing within certain limits without the use
of a hearing aid. Strathie's hearing was within the limits with the use of the hearing aid.
The district court, in a class action suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under
the fourteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Act, the Rehabilitation Act and certain state
law, found for the defendants. Appeal was then taken by Strathie under the Rehabilitation
Act and the fourteenth amendment, but the constitutional claim was not addressed by the
court.
148. Id. at 231; see Gisler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped; A Legal Perspective, 27 DE
PAUL L. REV. 953, 980-81 (1978); see generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1613.704 & 1613.705 (1982)
("reasonable accommodation" considerations and determining factors) (selection criteria
must pertain to essential functions of program).
149. 716 F.2d at 230 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 412-13 (1979)).
150. Id. at 231.
151. Id. The court refers to the possibility that broad judicial deference could "under-
mine Congress' intent in enacting section 504 that stereotypes or generalizations not deny
handicapped individuals equal access to federally-funded programs." Id. See also Doe v.
N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1981) (for discussion of court's limited ability,
compared to administrator's expertise, to determine qualification of handicapped individ-
uals); text accompanying notes 125-28 (for discussion of Doe and example of deference to
administrators).
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annual contract when she was retained on a continuing basis. After hav-
ing worked in Nassau County's public school system for eleven years,
Arline suffered a relapse of infectious tuberculosis in 1977, a disease she
had first contracted in 1957, at the age of 14.152 This was the first time
in the eleven years that she had worked for the School Board that she
tested positive, and the only time since her contraction of the disease.
At this point, Arline started chemotherapy treatments, which she contin-
uously received.1 53 After a leave of absence, she subsequently returned
to work, but in March of 1978, Arline again tested positive for the dis-
ease on a sputum culture.' 5 4 Following her temporary suspension from
teaching to allow for additional treatment, she returned to work; how-
ever, in November of 1978 she tested positive for tuberculosis a third
time. After a suspension in April of 1979 and two hearings, the School
Board eventually discharged her.
15 5
B. Lower Court Opinions
Mrs. Arline initially sought relief for her dismissal in state adminis-
trative proceedings, basing her complaint on the breach of her continu-
ing contract by the board. 156 This action resulted in a decision by the
State Board of Education reversing the School Board's dismissal of Mrs.
Arline. 157 An appeal was brought to the First District Court of Appeals
of the State of Florida, which held that her tubercular condition was
"good and sufficient cause" for her dismissal.' 5 8 In addition, a dissent
was filed, which based its opinion-that the failure to perform duties by
reason of personal illness is not sufficient grounds for dismissal-on a
strict reading of Arline's contract.'
59
152. Mrs. Arline underwent chemotherapy treatments from 1957, when she discovered
she had tuberculosis, to 1960. From 1960 to 1966, the year she was hired by the School
Board of Nassau County, Arline had no positive cultures for tuberculosis. School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 408 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Arline I).
In 1966, when Mrs. Arline first applied for her teaching position with the school
board, her application form contained a question inquiring whether she had any "physical
defects or peculiarities," to which she responded "none." After her initial hospitalization
for tuberculosis in 1957, her physicians had determined that she was "cured," Brief for
Appellant at 2, Arline, 107 S. Ct.. 1123 (1987).
153. Arline 1, 408 So. 2d at 707.
154. See id. at 707; Brief for Respondent at 3, Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
155. See Arline 1, 408 So. 2d at 707.
156. See Brief for Respondent at 3, Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
157. See Arline 1, 408 So. 2d at 706. The reasoning behind the school board's release of
Mrs. Arline from employment was best proclaimed by superintendent Craig Marsh when
he testified that she was not fired because of misconduct, but because of the "continued
reoccurrence [sic] of tuberculosis." Joint Appendix at 51-52, Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123
(1987). The Board of Education, in following the findings of the hearing officer in the
case, concluded that no "substantial competent evidence" was found in the record to sup-
port Mrs. Arline's dismissal by the school board. 408 So. 2d at 707.
158. Arline I, 408 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
159. Id. at 708-09. Paragraph nine of Mrs. Arline's contract read: "Failure of the
Teacher to fulfill this contract, and to carry out the lawful provisions hereof, unless prevented
from so doing by reason of personal illness or as otherwise provided by law, shall constitute
sufficient grounds for the termination of the contract by the County Board." Id. at 708
(emphasis added). The majority concluded that the only logical interpretation of the pro-
vision is that the illness be reasonable in terms of type and duration. They reached this
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After being denied relief in state administrative proceedings, Mrs.
Arline brought suit in federal district court against the School Board of
Nassau County and Craig Marsh, 160 alleging her dismissal violated sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.161 The majority of the medi-
cal evidence was presented by Marianne McEuen, M. D., 16 2 who testified
as to Mrs. Arline's medical history, her risks of infection, and sugges-
tions that the petitioner could teach older students or change to an ad-
ministrative position as a safer alternative to teaching third graders.'
63
The district court, in an oral opinion, ruled in favor of the defendants,
holding that the petitioner, though suffering from a handicap, was not a
"handicapped person" under the Act.164 The court reasoned that it was
"difficult ... to conceive that Congress intended contagious diseases to
be included within the definition of a handicapped person," and even
so, Arline was not "qualified" to teach elementary school.'
65
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit' 6 6 reversed and re-
manded the case, holding that contagious tuberculosis constitutes a
"handicap" under section 706(7)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act, and that
further findings were necessary to determine if Arline was "otherwise
qualified."' 167 Unlike the trial court, the court of appeals found that Ar-
line's affliction "falls . . . neatly within the statutory and regulatory
framework,"' 168 and that legislative direction presents no "objective evi-
dence" to limit the statute aside from that already specifically ex-
result by reading this section along with language in the contract permitting the board to
require the teacher to provide a negative tuberculosis report and to submit to a physical
examination. The majority reasoned that there would be no point to including these re-
quirements if no action could be taken upon their results. Id. The dissent read the provi-
sion as clear and unambiguous-it does not authorize the board to terminate the contract
upon physical incapability of Mrs. Arline to do her job. The dissent went on to say that
even if someone found the language to be ambiguous, rules pertaining to the construction
of contracts state that the ambiguity should be interpreted most strongly against the party
writing or selecting the language. In this case, the contract was a form prepared pursuant
to the rules of the State Board of Education of Florida, and therefore should be read most
favorably towards Mrs. Arline. Id. at 708-09.
160. Mr. Marsh was a party in both an individual capacity and as Superintendent of
Schools of Nassau County, Florida.
161. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 760 (11 th Cir. 1985) (Arline
II). Arline additionally brought an action in this court, which was also considered in the
court of appeals, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (denying due process of law).
Since this point was not appealed to the Supreme Court level, it will not be dealt with here.
162. An assistant director of the Community Tuberculosis Control Service of the Flor-
ida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Dr. McEuen, testified as an expert
on tuberculosis.
163. Joint Appendix at 15, 18-19, Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987) (Arline III). Dr. Mc-
Euen testified that young children were more susceptible to infection than older children.
Id.
164. 772 F.2d at 761.
165. Id. at 763 (quoting the district court's opinion).
166. Arline 11, 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985).
167. Id. at 759.
168. Id. at 764. The court noted that whether the person with tuberculosis is presently
afflicted ("has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits ... major life
activities," 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B), 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1)(i)) or is not presently afflicted
("has a record of such an impairment," 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii), and "is regarded as
having such an impairment," 45 U.S.C. § 84.4(j)(2)(iv)), she is covered by the statute. Ar-
line 11, 772 F.2d at 764.
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cluded.16 9 The Eleventh Circuit held they would be reluctant to create
exemptions where there is sparse evidence that Congress had any inten-
tion of doing so.17 0 In remanding the case, the court of appeals stated
that the lower court, in concluding that the school board had no duty to
accommodate Arline because of its "duty" to protect the public, made:
[N]o findings resolving the numerous factual disputes as to
whether the risks entailed in retaining Arline in her elementary
school position precluded her from having the necessary physi-
cal qualifications for the job, whether the same would be true if
she were transferred to a position teaching less susceptible in-
dividuals, or whether the costs involved in accommodating her
would place undue burdens on the school system.'71
An appeal by the school district and Craig Marsh was made to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on April 21, 1986,172 and the
case was argued on December 3, 1986.
C. The Majority
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 173 which affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals. The Court held that a person who
suffers from contagious tuberculosis can be a handicapped individual
within the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and
the Court remanded the case to the district court for determination as to
whether Arline is "otherwise qualified."' 174 The opinion was based on
the statutory and regulatory framework of section 504, and Congress'
intent in enacting the legislation.
The Court began by reviewing the history of the Rehabilitation Act,
stressing that the legislation covered all programs receiving federal
funds, and that its intent was a broad coverage' 7 5 of discriminatory
practices against the handicapped which restricted opportunities "that
other Americans take for granted."' 7 6 The Court also noted Congress
was concerned that the discrimination stemmed "not only from simple
prejudice, but from 'archaic attitudes and laws' and from 'the fact that
the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the
difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps.' "177
The Court found the regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services significant in helping to define "physical
169. Id. (referring to section 706(B)(2), which excludes drug and alcohol abusers
whose current use affects their job performance or threatens others).
170. Id. at 764.
171. Id. at 765.
172. 475 U.S. 1118 (1986).
173. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987), aflg, 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985).
174. Id. at 1132. At the time of the writing of this Comment, the case was in the discov-
ery stages in preparation for those questions remanded to the district court.
175. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
176. Id. at 1126 (quoting Sen. Humphrey) (citation omitted).
177. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 50 (1974)).
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impairment"1 78 and "major life activities," 179 used in the definition of a
handicapped individual under section 504.180 Considering these defini-
tions in context with the testimony by Dr. McEuen that Arline's tubercu-
losis "affected her respiratory system" and that she was hospitalized for
such, '8 the Court determined Arline had a record of impairment under
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(b)(ii) and concluded that she was a handicapped
individual. 1
82
The Court disagreed with the petitioner's contention that, even if a
contagious disease is a handicapping condition, it can be distinguished
from the disease's physical effects in this case.1 8 3 Since Arline's conta-
giousness and physical impairment were both caused by the tuberculo-
sis, the Court noted that allowing an employer to rely upon the
distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a
disease on a patient to justify discriminatory treatment would be un-
fair.' 8 4 The Court also pointed to the fact that congressional history
and action show concern about the effect of the handicap on others as
well as on the handicapped individual. It used the example of when
Congress intended coverage to those " 'regarded as having' a physical
or mental impairment;" such an impairment could limit a person's abil-
ity to work because of other's negative reactions to the condition.' 8 5
Those negative reactions, including fear and misapprehension of conta-
giousness, are what the Rehabilitation Act sought to protect against-
using sound medical judgment instead of illogical reactions to deter-
mine if one is handicapped and "otherwise qualified."' 8 6 The Court
stressed that the limited circumstances where a health threat is posed by
some persons who have contagious diseases does not justify exclusion
from the Act's coverage of all persons with actual or envisioned conta-
gious diseases. 1
87
178. "Physical impairment" is defined as: "(1) any physiological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body
systems ... ; or (2) any mental or psychological disorder . 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)
(1986).
179. "Major life activities" is defined as: "[Flunctions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1986).
180. Arline 111, 107 S. Ct. at 1127. "Handicapped individual" is defined as: "any per-
son who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is re-
garded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
181. This is a factor the Court deemed "more than sufficient to establish that one or
more of her major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment." Arline III,
107 S. Ct. 1123, 1127 (1987).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1128. The petitioners contended that Arline's record of impairment was
unimportant in the case at hand, for her dismissal was based upon the threat her possible
relapses of tuberculosis had on the health of others, not any diminished physical
capabilities.
184. d.; see also id. at n.7.
185. Id. at 1128-29. The opinion also mentions that "cosmetic disfigurement" is in-
cluded among the conditions the Department of Health and Human Services listed as il-
lustrative of physical impairments covered by the Act. Id. at 1129 n. 10.
186. Id. at 1129-30.
187. Id. at 1130.
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In determining that the district court must inquire on remand as to
whether Arline is "otherwise qualified,"' 8 8 the Court noted that the in-
quiry is essential to the section 504 goal of protecting the handicapped
from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unsubstantiated
fear, while balancing such valid concerns as avoiding the exposure of
significant health and safety risks to others. 18 9 The Court agreed with
amicus American Medical Association that the inquiry in the context of
this case should include findings of fact, based on reasonable medical
judgments, about the nature, duration, severity of the risk, and the
chances that the disease will be transmitted and cause harm.' 90
D. The Dissent
The Court was not without its disagreement, as shown in the dissent
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Justice Scalia.' 9 1
The dissent based its argument on the Supreme Court's prior conclu-
sions in disputes involving recipients of federal funding 19 2 and the
Court's past decisions interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.19 3 They cited the Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman 14
decision to bring to light the fact that the Court has treated situations
that involve the imposition of obligations, required by federal legislation
to be placed upon recipients of federal funds, as " 'much in the nature of
a contract.' ",195 This "contract," in which Congress exchanges funds in
return for the grantee's bearing the cost of providing the handicapped
with employment,' 9 6 bases its legitimacy on the voluntary and knowing
acceptance of the terms of the exchange by recipients of federal
funds. 19 7 In this case, Congress must speak "with a clear voice" so that
the recipient knows the conditions under which the funds are
accepted.1
9 8
This line of reasoning, taken from prior decisions by the Court, is
188. The Supreme Court noted that the district court "made no findings as to the dura-
tion and severity of Arline's condition, nor as to the probability that she would transmit
the disease .... whether Arline was contagious at the time she was discharged, or whether
the School Board could have reasonably accommodated her." Id. at 1131.
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 19, Arline
III, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987)).
191. Arline III, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1132 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192. See Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1982); Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (WhiteJ,
dissenting in part); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. See United States Dep't ofTransp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597
(1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
194. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
195. Arline 111, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1132 (1987) (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (citing United States Dep't ofTransp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597, 605
(1986) (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1983))
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17) (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
198. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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applied by the dissent to conclude that the protections of the Rehabilita-
tion Act do not extend to individuals discharged because of their conta-
gious tuberculosis. Citing the state and federal regulations covering the
area of contagious diseases,' 9 9 the dissent noted that two prior cases
decided by the Court, which dealt with such regulation and federal fund-
ing, held not to read the Act expansively. 20 0 Since the issue turned on
whether discrimination on the basis of contagiousness is discrimination
based on a handicap, and the dissenters found the language, regula-
tions, and legislative history of the Act silent on this question, they felt
that Arline was not under the Act's coverage.
20 '
In criticizing the majority's opinion, the dissent attacked the Court's
reasoning that the contagious effects of the disease could not be "mean-
ingfully" distinguished from its effects on the claimant under the Act.
The dissent reasoned that recognition by Congress that one could be
defined as handicapped based singularly on others' reactions demon-
strated that the reactions of others to the condition could not be consid-
ered separately from the condition's effect on the claimant. 20 2 The
additional point was made that the Court had no basis for extending
discrimination coverage to contagious diseases simply because of others'
reactions to a condition that might pose a threat to them. 20 3 Such lack of
evidence could in no way substantiate "knowing acceptance" by a re-
ceiver of federal funds that their receipt of such is "conditioned on Re-
habilitation Act regulation of public health issues."
20 4
IV. ANALYSIS
The School Board of Nassau County v. Arline opinion expands the cov-
erage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to persons inflicted with conta-
gious tuberculosis if a court deems that they (1) have been discriminated
against "solely" by reason of their condition and (2) are "otherwise qual-
ified" for the position sought. By not making a final determination on
whether Arline was "otherwise qualified," however, the Court left the
issue of the effect of contagiousness on qualification a question to be
decided by the district court. The district court was provided general
guidelines for assistance on this question,20 5. which gave deference to
199. d. at 1132-33 nn.1 & 2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
200. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n., 476 U.S. at 648, 650-53 (1986) (regulations
and procedures governing the provision of health care to mentally or physically impaired
infants are not authorized by section 504 and are invalid); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 303, 307 (1985) (Tennessee's reduction in annual inpatient hospital coverage and its
effect on Medicaid recipients is not covered by section 504).
201. Arline I11, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1133 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
202. d. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 1133-34 & n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1134 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205. The inquiry should include:
[Flindings of facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical
knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b)
the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the
risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the dis-
ease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.
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public health officials' conclusions on the "otherwise qualified" determi-
nation-a noteworthy twist in the judicial treatment of qualification
under the Act. Another area of interest is the dissent's generalized issue
treatment through comparisons with cases of little factual similarity, and
the "contract theory" used in their interpretation of the Act. Finally,
although the effects of the Arline decision seem to open judicial avenues
to the sufferers of contagious diseases, the Court specifically left unan-
swered whether carriers and sufferers of AIDS are protected by the Act,
thereby limiting the precedential value of the decision to case-by-case
analysis.
A. How the Majority "Faired"
The majority opinion in Arline concluded that the respondent was
handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act because she
suffered from a "physiological disorder or condition . . .affecting [her]
... respiratory [system]," 20 6 which would be protected by the Act if she
were considered "otherwise qualified." The Court stated that the judici-
ary normally "should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of pub-
lic health officials" when determining whether a handicapped individual
with a contagious disease is qualified to continue in the federally funded
activity. 20 7 The "otherwise qualified" determination was traditionally
based on facts collected by a private physician, the handicapped individ-
ual's physician or the medical officer of a program. 20 8 The Supreme
Court, however, correctly recognized the authority of public health offi-
cials in the area of controlling contagious diseases.
20 9
The present management of communicable diseases is governed by
both federal and state statutes. This legislation assigns the tasks in-
volved with reporting and isolation to public health officials. 2 10 These
officials, unaffected by the possible biases of the employer or handi-
capped claimant, can make the "reasonable medical judgements" re-
quired for the safety of all involved. Additionally, such officials, based
on their constant appraisal and continuing experience in the field of
contagious disease, have a knowledge base more than sufficient to effec-
tuate findings superior to an employer's medical officer or a general
Id. at 1131 (citing Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 19, Arline
111, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987)) (emphasis added).
206. Arline 111, 107 S. Ct. at 1127; see section 706(B)(2) and 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b).
207. Arline Ill, 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
208. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400-01 (1979)
(handicapped individual diagnosed by medical center audiologist); Doe v. New York Univ.,
666 F.2d 761, 769-70 (2d Cir. 1981) ("in-house" psychiatrists); Prewitt v. United States
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 1981) (postal medical officer); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 647 (2d Cir. 1979) (city school board
using city department of health); Doe v. Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621, 625 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(personal psychiatrist); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75, 76 (M.D. Fla. 1977)
(plaintiff's physicians specializing in neurological disorders).
209. At least one court has followed the directive of the Supreme Court in Arline as to
deference to public health officials, see Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center, 676 F. Supp.
945 (W.D. Mo. 1987); see infra note 242 (additional information on Kohl).
210. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
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physician. 2 1 1 Thus, the Court, in deferring the finding of facts concern-
ing Mrs. Arline's health condition to public health authorities, balanced
the federal interest in suppressing discrimination with the state interest
in controlling contagious disease.
The majority, elaborating on the state interest of controlling com-
municable diseases, pointed to the inclusion of contagious diseases
within the definition of "handicapped individual" as helping the state in
combating the spread of such infectious diseases. It reasoned that indi-
viduals would be less reluctant to disclose a contagious condition if as-
sured, by the Rehabilitation Act, of rational responses by employers and
sound medical judgments by public health officials as to whether they
were "otherwise qualified" to continue working.2 12 The presence of
federal legislation in the area of federal-state cooperation regarding the
control and prevention of communicable disease also supports the ma-
jority's position. Statutory authorization is given to the Secretary of
HHS to accept from and give assistance to state and local authorities in
the prevention and suppression of communicable disease. 2
13
An individual must be both handicapped and "otherwise qualified"
to be entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act, and Arline,
suffering from contagious tuberculosis, is handicapped. 2 14 This deci-
sion followed the intentions of Congress and treated the respondent
fairly, while leaving open the opportunity for the petitioner to prove Ar-
line unqualified in order to protect the school district from any reason-
able risks presented by the disease.2 15 If the law did not weigh both
sides, but rather solely based decisions on finding an individual "handi-
capped," the employer would not be allowed to discriminate between a
qualified and unqualified applicant. The employer would be forced to
place a handicapped and contagious individual in the work place without
regard to qualification, and anyone who was in contact with the carrier
would be in danger of contracting the ailment.
2 16
211. An inconsistency in the record of the case created the opportunity for the
Supreme Court to act on this issue. An amicus curiae brief for Arline was filed which stated
findings that contradicted Arline's record of tuberculosis. The Court, in coping with this
administrative dilemma, reasoned that the expertise in communicable diseases lies with
public health officials.
212. Arline Ill, 107 S. Ct. at 1130 n.15.
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 243.
214. See supra notes 93-151 and accompanying text.
215. Dr. McEuen testified that three factors provide the basis for determining the
chances of getting tuberculosis. The extent of contagiousness of the carrier is "a matter of
degree," and is determined from the number of bacilli found in either the sputum culture,
which takes several weeks to grow, or from a microscopic examination of a stained sputum
smear. The age of the exposed individual also varies the risks involved; a young child is more
susceptible than is an older child or adult. Additionally, the length of time spent in a con-
fined area with the carrier affects the level of contagiousness. Joint Appendix at 16, 37-38,
Arline Il, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
216. See Arline Il, 107 S. Ct. at 1129-30. On the subject of accommodation, the Court
stated that employers have an affirmative obligation to reasonably accommodate handi-
capped employees; and "[allthough they are not required to find another job for an em-
ployee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an employee
alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing
policies." Id. at 1131 n.19. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 & app. A at 315-16 (1986). The Nassau
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Empathy with the School Board of Nassau County, which felt
threatened by this type of situation, is understandable. Upon examina-
tion of the interests in the health of the children attending the school at
which Arline taught, the worries of those children's parents, and the ad-
vice of the consulted health official,2 17 one could arrive at the response
taken by the School Board. Yet, this does not make the discriminatory
action legal. The Court's demand for a case-by-case analysis of "other-
wise qualified," based upon reasonable medical judgments by public
health officials, provides rational treatment deserved by those who must
deal with the real, as well as imagined, fears associated with such a con-
tagious impairment. 21 8 It also serves to limit this holding to an expan-
sion of the list of possible conditions covered by the Act and, thus,
makes no universal ruling on the question of "otherwise qualified."
B. How the Dissent Struggled
The dissent was hindered by its inability to fathom the majority's
reasoning and analyze the facts in a logical, supportable manner. They
criticized the majority's holding for invading extensive state regulation
of contagious diseases, arguing that the Court "has declined to read the
Rehabilitation Act expansively" when faced with an area so regu-
lated.21 9 The dissent relied on general statements that the Court made
in Bowen v. American Hospital Association 2 20 and Alexander v. Choate,2 2 1 but
these statements are principles tailored for those particular decisions,
both of which involved questions other than whether an individual is
"handicapped." Bowen discussed whether the Act authorizes HHS to pro-
mulgate mandatory provisions requiring strict procedures in treatment
of handicapped infants based on their absolute right to receive services
County School Board has a policy of allowing teachers to teach out of certification until
they can receive such. This alternative was not offered to Arline, though Dr. McEuen felt
that it was within reasonable medical judgment that she could teach older children. Joint
Appendix at 15, 19.
217. See supra notes 163 & 214 (determinations of Dr. McEuen).
218. This reasoning was also used in a New York City Supreme Court case, District 27
Community School v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986):
Although this court certainly empathizes with the fears and concerns of parents
for the health and welfare of their children within the school setting, at the same
time it is duty bound to objectively evaluate the issue of automatic exclusion ac-
cording to the evidence gathered and not to be influenced by unsubstantiated
fears of catastrophe.
Id. at 413, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
219. Arline III, 107 S. Ct. at 1132-33 (citations omitted). The dissent remarked on how
the Court, in Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), made it clear that, "where Congress intends to
impose a condition on the grant of federal funds, 'it must do so unambiguously.'" Arline
III, 107 S. Ct. at 1132 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
dissent cites various state statutes regulating contagious diseases, which address "report-
ing requirements, quarantines, denial of marriage licenses based on the presence of cer-
tain diseases, compulsory immunization, and certification and medical testing
requirements for school employees." Id. at 1132 n.2. (citations omitted) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
220. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
221. 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (Tennessee's reduction in annual inpatient hospital coverage
and its effect on Medicaid recipients is not covered by section 504)).
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or benefits from federally-funded state agencies. 2 22 Alexander consid-
ered whether the Act forces a state to alter its regulations to provide the
most favorable services for Medicaid recipients. 223 These issues sharply
contrast with the questions presented in Arline, which addressed the in-
clusion of an individual's physical impairment as a handicap defined by
the Act, and whether, based upon a case-by-case analysis, the individual
is "otherwise qualified" for participation in the federally-funded pro-
gram involved.
2 24
Bowen briefly touched upon the issue of whether the infant involved,
born with a congenital defect, was handicapped and possibly "otherwise
qualified." The Court recognized that the Act's use of handicapped in-
dividual included infants with congenital defects, and that "meaningful
access" to medical services would be required by the Act if the infant
were "otherwise qualified" and denied the services. 2 25 However, the
Court noted that "no such rule or policy is challenged, or indeed has
been identified, in this case," and that no specific decision as to treat-
ment of an individual was in question. The specific issue raised by the
action was whether four mandatory rules relating to procedure and
treatment of the infants were authorized by section 504 of the Act.
2 26
The facts in Alexander involved a state proposal to limit the number
of annual inpatient hospital days that state Medicaid would pay hospitals
for Medicaid patients. The issues, as those in Bowen, centered on the
222. 476 U.S. at 610-11, 624. (regulations and procedures governing the provision of
health care to mentally or physically impaired infants are not authorized by secion 504
and are invalid).
223. 469 U.S. at 287-88, 303, 307-09.
224. See supra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
225. 476 U.S. 610, 624 (1986). The American Medical Association and the American
Hospital Association, along with other medical associations, brought an action to declare
certain rules promulgated by HHS---entitled "Final Rules"--invalid and to enjoin their
enforcement. The Final Rules in question, which formed procedures in the health care of
handicapped infants, required that (1) health care providers post notices stating that sec-
tion 504 bars the withholding of health care from infants on the basis of mental or physical
impairments; (2) state child protective services agencies prevent unlawful medical neglect
of handicapped infants; (3) immediate access to patient medical records be provided; and
(4) expedited compliance actions be taken. Id. at 610-11, 613-14.
226. Id. at 624-26. In formulating its opinion, the Court examined United States v. Uni-
versity Hospital, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). The
facts involved an infant born with multiple congenital defects who required corrective sur-
gery to prolong the child's life. The parents of the child decided against the surgery,
which would not have dramatically affected the infant's handicapping conditions, and the
hospital did not proceed with the operation. Public health officials, acting on an anony-
mous complaint of medical neglect, requested the hospital to release the records on the
case, and the hospital declined, noting that the parents had given no consent for any re-
lease. 575 F. Supp. at 614-15.
The district court, in ruling on an action brought by the government based partially
upon its authority to enforce section 504, stated that the evidence established that no right
to access the information existed under the facts of the case. No violation of the Act had
occurred, the court said, for the hospital had always been willing to operate, but had not
done so because of the parents refusal to consent, not because the infant was handicapped.
Id.
The Bowen Court used this same reasoning in finding that no violation of section 504
can occur when parental consent for medical treatment is withheld: "without the consent
of the parents ... the infant is neither 'otherwise qualified' for treatment nor has he been
denied care 'solely by reason of his handicap.' " 476 U.S. at 630 (footnote omitted).
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standards to be applied in a situation involving the handicapped-not
whether individuals themselves are handicapped. 2 2 7 Questions were
raised by Medicaid recipients about specific limitations or any limita-
tions, for such limitations would have a disproportionate effect on the
handicapped resulting in disparate impact discrimination. The Court
held that the limitation had no discriminatory motive, and that the
assistance provided to the handicapped need not amount to more cover-
age than is received by non-handicapped individuals.
2 28
These cases involved a paucity of factual consistency with Arline, and
such dissimilarity is pivotal in the present analysis. Bowen's authorization
of procedural rules and Alexander's degrees of accommodation involved
situations where an expansive reading of the Act would absolutely limit a
state's freedom in certain circumstances, as when performing services
and benefits and adapting accommodation policies to unique circum-
stances. The expansion including communicable diseases as a handicap
under Arline does not involve any such absolute restrictions or limita-
tions. It is, instead, an application of federal law-not an extension over
state law-and in this light, the comparison between the decision in Ar-
line with Bowen and Alexander is irrelevant.
This treatment of the issues is even more absurd when considering
that the dissent simply ignored the broad construction 229 and expansive
language of the Rehabilitation Act, in which the facts of Arline's condi-
tion so readily fit. If they had applied the language as broadly as they
handled the issues, the dissent might have interpreted the facts as had
the majority. Instead, they determined that judicially-implied federal
obligations to funded programs should override the plain language of
existing federal legislation.
The dissent's "obligation" theory, formulated from Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman,2 30 and nonexpansion philosophy, for-
mulated from Bowen and Alexander, advocate that decisions on whether an
individual is handicapped should be based on the view that federal legisla-
tion imposing obligations only on recipients of federal funds is "much in
227. Since the limitations had not taken effect prior to the class action suit, Alexander
did not involve any discrimination against an individual, but like Bowen, the problem was
policy-based. In each case, the Court held that the policy or effect of the policy in question
was not of the type Congress contemplated to be covered by the Rehabilitation Act.
Treatment decisions, as in Bowen, and limitation policies resulting in disparate impact dis-
crimination, as in Alexander, when applied to the handicapped, require a different analysis
of the Act than does a question of a handicap itself, as in Arline. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 623
(citing United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 161 (1984)) ("[Clongress never
contemplated that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would apply to treatment deci-
sions involving defective newborn infants when the statute was enacted.., or at any subse-
quent time."); Alexander, 469 U.S. at 298-99 ("[T]here is reason to question whether
Congress intended § 504 to embrace all claims of disparate-impact discrimination.").
228. 469 U.S. at 302-03.
229. "This Court has noted the remedial nature of the Rehabilitation Act and held that
its provisions are to be accorded a broad construction in order to effectuate its purpose."
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 624 (1984) (citation omitted) (unani-
mous decision).
230. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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the nature of a contract. ' 23 1 The "contract" is a quidpro quo relationship
conditioning receipt of federal funding on state support of handicap em-
ployment, which is based on the recipient "knowingly accepting] the
terms of the exchange."' 23 2 Taking this element of the dissent's theory
to its logical conclusion, since Congress failed to include any list of im-
pairments, nothing amounts to a handicap under the Act, and no protec-
tion can result. The dissent's "contract" theory might work if the Act
specifically listed those conditions that would constitute "handicapped."
However, Congress never included such a list of impairments in the stat-
ute, and the HEW regulations implementing section 504 state that it was
excluded "because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness
of any such list."'2 33 The dissent overlooks the fact that the terms of the
Rehabilitation Act are broad, and that Congress spoke "with a clear
voice" when it refused to limit the definition of handicapped in this way.
It is clear from those conditions already considered as handicaps byjudi-
cial interpretation under the Act, and from the language defining "phys-
ical impairment" 23 4 and "major life activities," '23 5 that recipients could
make reasonable judgments as to impairments that might render one
handicapped for purposes of the Act's protection.
Nonetheless, the application of a "contract" theory could have in-
consistent, if not alarming, effects if a court, for example, looked to the
intent of the parties in defining "handicapped individual" instead of the
legislation governing such terms. A "meeting of the minds," instead of
legislative intent, might be the standard used since Congress did not
specifically list conditions within the four corners of the "contract." Yet,
it is unreasonable to conclude that Congress desired, or ever contem-
plated, this result. The Act was not written as a contract, but as an anti-
discrimination measure by the nation's leading employer and funder. It
is doubtful that the federal government would see fit to allow discrimi-
natory practices in certain programs and activities just because they
were not federally funded. Thus, Congress spoke as unambiguously as
possible by limiting relief under section 504 to those "handicapped"
and "otherwise qualified," while still maintaining a broad scope of appli-
cation for the Act necessary to protect handicapped individuals suffering
from a wide range of discriminatory practices.
The majority opinion dealt with the dissent's "contract" theory in
two ways. First, the Court noted that such a theory ignores the plain
language of the Act, along with its implementing procedures. Second,
the statutory provision that the dissent bases its argument on, taken
from Pennhurst, was held to be "simply a general statement of 'findings' "
231. Arline III, 107 S. Ct. at 1132 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
232. Id. (citing United States Dep't. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597,
605 (1986); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633, n.13 (1984); Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
233. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. 310 (1986)).
234. See supra note 178.
235. See supra note 179.
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which only presented a preference by Congress in treatment of certain
situations, a "stark" contrast to section 504's anti-discrimination or-
der.23 6 Both of these rebuttals are well founded, for they use basic ca-
nons of judicial reasoning and reveal the dissent's struggle. The first
response goes to the core of statutory interpretation: "the starting point
of any inquiry into the application of a statute is the language of the
statute itself."' 23 7 The second rebuttal attacks the dissent's "buckshot"
approach in Arline when applying past decisions to present fact patterns.
By emphasizing the express distinctions, and not the dissent's implicit
similarities between Arline and section 504 cases previously decided by
the Court, the majority was able to weave the law and Congress' intent
for broad application with the facts in the present case to produce a
pattern that seemed tailored to stymie discrimination against the handi-
capped. The Court, though, failed to provide a case of clear preceden-
tial value for future similar situations concerning other communicable
diseases, such as AIDS.
C. The Effects of Arline: Doing So Much, Yet So Little
The majority sensed the necessity to address the ramifications that
Arline would have on AIDS discrimination cases brought under the Re-
habilitation Act. When it granted certiorari to a discrimination action
involving a communicable disease, the Court must have realized that the
opinion stemming from such a decision would have great precedential
value for the rest of the judiciary, both federal and state alike. Yet, the
majority specifically entertained the questions involving AIDS with a
mere footnote,23 8 and "skirted" the issue of whether a carrier of AIDS
would be protected under the Rehabilitation Act as a "handicapped
individual."
The responsibility that accompanies the Supreme Court's authority
of final judicial review should entail guidance in the determination of
questions pressing the Nation's courts. This responsibility is especially
significant when the opportunity for such timely direction is present in
one of the few cases involving the Rehabilitation Act that reaches the
Court's docket. 2 39 Yet, the Supreme Court, like any other federal or
state court, is not required to pass upon issues which are not present in a
case. It is possible, however, for a law-moving decision to find its impe-
tus in those areas left to silence.
236. Arline I1, 107 S Ct. at 1130 n.15.
237. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979).
238. The footnote reads:
This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the questions whether
a carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a
physical impairment, or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the
basis of contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.
Arline III, 107 S. Ct. at 1128 n.7. See generally District 27 Community School v. Board of
Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (for discussion of HTLV
III/LAV, the transmitted AIDS virus, and AIDS Related Virus (ARV)).
239. See District 27 Comm. School, 130 Misc. 2d at 402, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 329; see also, e.g.,
Storar v. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 369-70, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66-67, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268-69
(N.Y. App. 1981).
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In Arline, the Court was silent on the issue of whether a carrier of
AIDS, who suffers no physical impairment, is handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act. It simply noted its refusal to expand the holding,
and left this issue for the rest of the judiciary to struggle with. By doing
so, the Court left the question open to more litigation; but, was ex-
panded litigation truly the majority's intent?
The majority points out amendments extending the Act's coverage
to those " 'regarded as having' a physical or mental impairment" which
thereby limits a major life activity.2 40 They specifically noted that an
impairment limiting an individual's ability to work was within these
guidelines. 24 1 Considering these facts, many people could regard those
that are asymptomatic carriers of AIDS as impaired, based on unin-
formed assumptions and unfounded apprehension of contagiousness.
In discussing the fears and myths associated with contagiousness, the
majority reiterated its belief that interpretation of the definition "handi-
capped" should be broad, and emphasis should be placed on the addi-
tional requirement of being "otherwise qualified" for paramount
consideration for protection under the Act.2 4 2 Following this line of
reason, discrimination in the work place against an asymptomatic carrier
would amount to discrimination against a handicapped individual, and
case-by-case analysis as to qualification could determine if protection by
the Act was applicable.
243
Recent evidence has pointed to the possibility of a causal connec-
tion between tuberculosis and the HIV virus associated with AIDS.
2 4 4
Reports based in New York City have interpreted the concurrent rise of
tuberculosis morbidity and cases of immunodeficiency caused by HIV
infection in males 20 to 49 years old as related, 24 5 and have also associ-
ated asymptomatics infected with the HIV virus with the increase in tu-
berculosis. If this latter conclusion was found to be accurate, those
persons who are asymptomatic carriers of AIDS and who develop tuber-
culosis would have manifested a physical impairment affecting their re-
spiratory system and would, no doubt, under the holding in Arline, be
considered handicapped.
2 4 6
240. Arline II1, 107 S. Ct. at 1128.
241. Id. at 1129 n.10. Justice Brennan pointed to Congress' intention that "the pri-
mary goal of the Act is to increase employment of the handicapped." Id. (citing Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 633 n. 13 (1984)).
242. Id. at 1129-30.
243. See Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center, 676 F. Supp. 945, 948 (W.D. Mo. 1987)
(the district court, in finding that carrier of Hepatitis B was "handicapped" under section
504, concluded that their decision was consistent with the Supreme Court reasoning in
Arline); see also District 27 Comm. School, 130 Misc. 2d at 418-19, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27
("Exclusive reliance and underlying data furnished by physician and parent of child in-
fected with HTLV-III/LAV is not appropriate for purposes of proposed case-by-case re-
view .... ").
244. See 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORTS 786-90 (December 11, 1987).
245. Id. at 787.
246. The report mentions two possibilities in which the immuno-deficiency may esca-
late the risk of tuberculosis. There is a likelihood that susceptibility to new infection, cre-
ated by the immuno-deficiency, could allow for a rapid spread of the tuberculosis.
Another possibility, the one believed to be most prevalent, is that the tuberculosis infec-
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There is little doubt that a claimant who suffers from either AIDS or
AIDS related complex ("ARC") would be protected as a handicapped
individual under the Act. The issues in the Arline case revolved around
an individual who suffered from a disease which manifested a physical
impairment and contagiousness, and such conditions are also found in
those with AIDS or ARC. 2 4 7 The Court, in determining the Arline case
by statutory interpretation, inquired into the application of the Rehabili-
tation Act by applying "the language of the statute itself" to the facts.
24 8
In the definitions promulgated for the Act, "physical impairment"
means "any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting one or more
of the following body systems ... neurological; musculoskeletal; special
sense organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive; genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 2 49 The "major life activi-
ties" affected by this impairment are "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." 2 50 The symptomatic sufferer of
AIDS is plagued by a "physiological disorder" that, because of its effects
on the individual's immune system, affects all body systems, thereby lim-
iting many of the activities engaged in each day.
In a recent New York case, District 27 Community School v. Board of
Education, the issue of whether a sufferer of AIDS was handicapped was
considered by applying, in a like fashion to the Supreme Court in Arline,
the language of the Rehabilitation Act. 25 ' This was an action brought
by certain school board members who questioned a school board policy
that children with AIDS, or those suspected of having AIDS, were not
automatically excluded from public schools, but reviewed on a case-by-
case basis. 25 2 The New York Supreme Court held that the children with
AIDS were handicapped under the Act, and their automatic exclusion
would be a violation of their rights under the Rehabilitation Act.2 53 The
tion was latent in the system, and the immuno-deficiency allowed it to develop into the
manifested disease. Id. at 789.
247. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS") is basically the manifestation of a
disease linked to a defect in a host's cell-mediated immunity, brought on by human T
lymphotropic virus type III ("HTLV III") or lymphadenopathy-associated virus ("LAV").
See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1392-93 (1lth ed. 1987). HTLV
III/LAV infection results in a broad range of clinical illnesses, from secondary complica-
tions of the specific immune defect to fever, weight loss, diarrhea, fatigue, night sweats,
lymphadenopathy, and immunologic abnormalities. The latter group represents the
symptoms associated with AIDS related complex ("ARC"), suffered by symptomatic carri-
ers of HTLV III/LAV whose condition does not meet the requirements for full-blown
AIDS. Id. at 1394.
248. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597, 604 (1986);
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520 (1984).
249. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1986) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b)
(1986).
250. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1986).
251. District 27 Community School, 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986).
252. Id. at 417, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 339. The court concluded that outside expertise, such
as public health personnel, should assist in the determination of what risks are presented
by allowing the contagious individual to remain in school. Id.
253. Id. at 414-15, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37.
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court used the same strict application of the language of the Act to an
individual suffering from AIDS as the Supreme Court applied to an indi-
vidual suffering from tuberculosis in Arline. The New York court con-
cluded that the HTLV-III/LAV virus creates a physical impairment of
the hemic and lymphatic body systems when it destroys certain lympho-
cytes. 254 The court also determined that the children suffering from
AIDS would be "treated ... as having such an impairment" if they were
automatically excluded from the classroom.2 55 An "otherwise quali-
fied" determination must first be made as to whether the risks present in
each case require exclusion. 25 6 This case, although decided by a state
supreme court, reveals the ease with which lower courts could apply in-
terpretations similar to those of the Supreme Court in Arline.25 7 Addi-
tionally, it shows that inclusion of communicable diseases as handicaps
within the Act provides a realistic and workable solution for discrimina-
tion based on the real or perceived fears associated with these
conditions.
V. CONCLUSION
Laws prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped must be
interpreted broadly by the courts-the language of the legislation, the
variety of disabilities that give rise to handicaps, the diversity of areas
where such discrimination is found, and the problems caused by the
long-standing prejudices that make living, at times, difficult for the
handicapped demand it. The Supreme Court decision in School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline extended the area of conditions that the Rehabili-
tation Act may include, but it did not expand or contract the scope of
qualifications necessary for coverage. Instead, Arline only maintained
the Act's application within "manageable" bounds.
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254. Id. at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
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256. Id. The means of transmission of AIDS, critical in determining the risks of infec-
tion, are much like those of a carrier of the hepatitis B virus, the condition dealt with in
New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979). The
HTLV-III/LAV retroviral agent of AIDS, though, is a fragile virus that has a lower order of
infectivity than the hepatitis B virus. District 27 Comm. School, 130 Misc. 2d at 405, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 330.
257. See also Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Ca.
1987) (employee terminated from job because AIDS is considered "handicapped" under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
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ADDENDUM
Since the writing of the Arline article, at least one federal district
court has ruled on whether an asymptomatic carrier of the AIDS virus is
covered by the Rehabilitation Act. In Doe v. Centinela Hospital, No. CV
87-2514 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988), the District Court for the Central
District of California held that the asymptomatic carrier, infected with
the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"), could not be excluded
from a hospital's residential drug and alcohol treatment program be-
cause of the fear of contagion. The court's ruling on the motion for
summary judgment stated that, under the Arline decision, the fear of
contagion constituted a handicapped condition under the Rehabilitation
Act. The issues of whether the carrier was "otherwise qualified" and
excluded solely because of his handicap must be decided by a trial.

